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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joseph A Knight appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance, challenging the denial of his suppression motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Knight was detained by officers executing a search warrant. (R., p. 10.) 
He was searched and found in possession of methamphetamine. (R., p. 10.) 
The state charged Knight with possession of methamphetamine with a persistent 
violator enhancement. (R., pp. 36-39.) 
Knight moved to suppress evidence found as a result of his detention and 
search. (R., pp. 60-61.) According to the district court's findings of fact, officers 
executed a search warrant at a residence. (R., pp. 150-51.) The probable cause 
finding for the warrant was based, in part, on two controlled buys of 
methamphetamine at the residence and a garbage search that revealed "drug 
evidence such as needles, baggies, and cut up needles." (R., p. 151.) Before 
executing the search warrant officers watching the house saw "several people 
entering and exiting the residence" in a manner suggesting drug activity. (R., pp. 
151, 154-55.) When officers entered the residence to execute the warrant they 
secured the premises by seizing those inside, including Knight. (R., p. 151.) An 
officer frisked Knight for weapons. (R., p. 151.) The officer detected something 
in Knight's right front pocket, which he concluded was not a weapon. (R., p. 
151.) Based on a determination to arrest those within the house for frequenting a 
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place where drugs are sold, officers searched Knight and, from the right front 
pocket, removed methamphetamine. (R., pp. 151-52.) 
The district court concluded the search of Knight's pocket was justified as 
incident to Knight's arrest for frequenting, and denied the motion to suppress. 
(R., pp. 153-56.) Knight thereafter entered a guilty plea (R., p. 170), apparently 
preserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress (R., p. 165). 
The district court imposed but suspended a sentence of five years with two years 
fixed and placed Knight on probation for five years. (R., pp. 176-77.) Knight filed 
a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 185-88.) 
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ISSUE 
Knight states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Knight's motion 
to suppress the State's evidence? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Knight failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in either its 
factual findings or legal analysis in concluding that the police had probable cause 
to arrest him for frequenting a house where drugs are sold? 
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ARGUMENT 
Knight Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That The 
Police Had Probable Cause To Arrest Him For Frequenting A House Where 
Drugs Are Sold 
A. Introduction 
The district court determined that the search was constitutionally 
reasonable as incident to Knight's arrest for frequenting. (R., pp. 153-56.) On 
appeal Knight asserts that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for 
frequenting. (Appellant' brief, pp. 6-19.) Application of the law to the facts found 
by the district court, however, supports the conclusion that probable cause 
supported Knight's arrest for frequenting. Thus Knight has failed to show error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, the 
appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. State v. Duvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641, 643-44 
(1998). The court exercises free review over whether constitutional requirements 
have been satisfied in light of the facts found. Id. 
C. Application Of The Law To The Facts Found By The District Court 
Supports The Finding Of Probable Cause 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 
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479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct App. 1999).) A search incident to arrest is a well-
established exception to the warrant requirement and, as such, does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); 
Kerley, 134 Idaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493. "For an arrest to be considered lawful, 
it must be based on probable cause" to believe the arrestee has committed a 
crime. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009) 
(citations omitted). 
Determining the existence of probable cause is "a practical, common-
sense decision" whether, given all the circumstances, there is "a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983). Probable cause does not require an actual showing of criminal 
activity, but only the "probability or substantial chance" of such activity. !st at 
244-45 n.13. A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is 
involved is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981). The facts known to the officers must 
be judged in accordance with "the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
Application of the law to the facts shows no error by the district court. 
Frequenting is "to be present at or on premises of any place where he knows 
illegal controlled substances are . . . being held for distribution, transportation, 
delivery, administration, use, or to be given away." I.C. § 37-2732(d). It is 
uncontroverted that Knight was at the premises and that there was probable 
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cause to believe controlled substances were being held for distribution, delivery 
or use at the premises. The only question was whether police had probable 
cause to believe Knight knew that controlled substances were being held for 
distribution, delivery or use at the residence. Evidence that two controlled buys 
had been performed at the house; that the trash showed controlled substance 
use and dealing at the house; that Knight was not seen leaving or entering the 
house for two hours before execution of the warrant; and that others were seen 
coming and going in a pattern that suggested ongoing drug dealing in the 
residence all lead to the reasonable inference that Knight was aware of the drug 
activities around him. 
In Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 368 (2003), police stopped a car 
with three people in it. They searched the car after obtaining consent from the 
driver and found a large amount of cash in a roll in the glove compartment and 
baggies of cocaine tucked behind the folded-up armrest in the back seat. kl 
After all three men in the car denied knowledge of the drugs and cash, officers 
arrested all three. kl at 368-69. Pringle, the front-seat passenger, later admitted 
that the drugs and cash were his. kl After being charged, Pringle moved to 
suppress evidence, asserting officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. kl at 
369. After setting forth the general standards of probable cause the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that the arrests were supported by probable 
cause. kl at 369-72. "We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these 
facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised 
dominion and control over, the cocaine." kl at 372. 
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The Court clarified that it was not finding probable cause on mere 
proximity to the cocaine. lQ.,. at 372-73. Stated the Court: 
Pringle and his two companions were in a relatively small 
automobile, not a public tavern. [We have previously] noted that a 
car passenger-unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra [v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)]-will often be engaged in a common 
enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing 
the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing. Here we think it was 
reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the 
three men. The quantity of drugs and cash indicate the likelihood 
of drug dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to 
admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence 
against him. 
lQ.,. at 373 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Likewise in this case the officers had far more information suggesting guilt 
than mere proximity. The evidence indicated regular drug activities in the house 
and, more specifically, suggested that Knight was in the house for at least two 
hours while drugs were being sold. The inference that he knew of the drug 
activities in the house is about as strong as the inference that someone who has 
spent two hours in a Starbucks knows that coffee is sold there. 
Knight relies primarily on State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 688 P .2d 1203 
(Ct. App. 1984), and Ybarra, 444 U.S. 85. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12.) Neither 
of these cases supports his argument, however. 
In Crabb a detective set up a controlled buy with a dealer, who told the 
detective that he would get an ounce of cocaine from his source, and that his 
source had additional quantities of cocaine at his house. Crabb, 107 Idaho at 
301. Officers thereafter saw the dealer leave his own home, go to a specific 
mobile home, pick someone else up there, then drive to the controlled buy where 
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the dealer sold an ounce of cocaine to the detective. kl After arresting the 
dealer and the person he had picked up, police acquired a search warrant for the 
mobile home. kl "When Crabb appeared at the door" of the mobile home being 
searched, he was arrested for frequenting. Id. Crabb's connection to the 
residence was at that time unknown. kl The Court of appeals held that this 
initial arrest was illegal: 
The officers in the present case arrested Crabb the moment 
he appeared at the door of the mobile home. They did not then 
have reason to suspect that Crabb knew that illegal controlled 
substances were being held at that place. Thus, Crabb was 
arrested for his mere presence at a place suspected of containing 
controlled substances. 
kl at 303, 688 P.2d at 1208 (emphasis original). 
In Ybarra officers searched every patron of a tavern pursuant to a state 
statute that allowed a search of any person on the premises when a search 
warrant is executed. 444 U.S. at 89. The information supporting the search 
warrant in that case was that a certain bartender, while at the bar, was seen in 
possession of packets suspected to contain heroin and had stated that he would 
have heroin for sale on a particular date. kl at 87-88. The application for the 
warrant to search the bar and the specific bartender on that date did not indicate 
that any patron of the bar was involved in drug activities, either as a dealer or a 
customer. kl at 90. Police "knew nothing in particular about Ybarra, except that 
he was present, along with several other customers, in a public tavern at a time 
when the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for 
sale." kl at 90-91. The Court concluded that "a person's mere propinquity to 
others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give 
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rise to probable cause to search that person. Where the standard is probable 
cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause 
particularized with respect to that person." kl at 91 (citations omitted). 
In contrast to Crabb, who merely walked to the door of a house where 
drugs were suspected of being held, or Ybarra, who was merely a customer in a 
bar where a bartender was suspected of having drugs for sale, Knight spent two 
hours in a house while drug sales were apparently ongoing. The police did not 
merely assume guilt by proximity, but instead reasonably inferred knowledge of 
the presence of drugs from prolonged presence while drug sales were taking 
place. The police did not have to assume that Knight was oblivious to the drug 
activity around him, and Knight's request that this Court do so is contrary to the 
applicable legal standards and fails to show error by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Knight's judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 20 5. 
KENNETH K. JOR 
Deputy Attorney Ge eral 
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